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1 Introduction
The intended audience of [Bez14] is probably aware that much of Leo Esakia’s research concen-
trated on semantics for the intuitionistic logic IPC, the modal logic GLcl of Lo¨b, its weakening
wGrzcl and intuitionistic-modal systems like the logic KM or its weakening mHC; see Table
2 for all definitions. GLcl is also known as the Go¨del-Lo¨b logic, but this name may suggest
more personal involvement with the system than Go¨del ever had; KM or mHC will be dis-
cussed in Section 4. A central feature of semantics for such systems is well-foundedness or
scatteredness. While in the case of IPC well-foundedness is a sufficient, but not necessary
condition—intuitionistic logic is complete wrt well-founded or even finite partial orders, but
sound wrt much bigger class of structures—GLcl and KM require it even for soundness. This
is due to the fact that the latter two systems include a form of an explicit induction axiom: in
the case of GLcl the well-known Lo¨b axiom (which here will be called the weak Lo¨b axiom) and
in the case of KM the strong Lo¨b axiom—less well-known to modal logicians, but as we are
going to see, better known to type theorists. Scatteredness is the topological generalization
of well-foundedness; Simmons [Sim82] provided tools necessary to define its point-free coun-
terpart and the Tbilisi school noted that this notion also makes sense in the topos setting.
In fact, the most generic way of defining scateredness is via modal syntax: as validity of the
Lo¨b principle for a suitable “later” modality.
The interplay of relational, topological, point-free and algebraic aspects in the above para-
graph should not feel unnatural to anybody familiar with Leo’s attitude to research. Let us
look at an important example how results can travel from one setting to another. In the
mid-1970’s, it was established that Lo¨b-like logics enjoy the so-called Fixpoint Theorem. At
first, the intention was to grasp the algebraic content of Go¨del’s Diagonalization Lemma. Yet
in its own right it turned out to be one of the most fascinating results ever proved about such
systems. Section 3 gives an overview of some of its applications and consequences. For now,
let us just mention that Leo Esakia used it, e.g., to characterize algebras for KM, see Theo-
rem 14 and Corollary 15 here. Furthermore, it seems to have inspired the work on scattered
toposes: [EJP00, Section 3] claims to present its topos-theoretic counterpart. However, as the
result central for the topos version (Theorem 40 here) does not even include modalities in its
formulation, the word counterpart has to be understood rather loosely.
As we will see, in hindsight [EJP00] turns out to be closely connected to very recent
developments in Theoretical Computer Science, in particular the work of Birkedal et al. on
the topos of trees [BMSS12], itself an example of a scattered topos. Thus, it seems particularly
regrettable that the spadework of the Tbilisi school has not been carried further and is not
more widely known.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls syntactic and semantic basics of
intuitionistic normal modal logics. Section 3 focuses on fixpoint results for Lo¨b-like systems.
Section 4 introduces the work of the Georgian school on extensions of mHC. Finally, Section
5 discusses scattered toposes, beginning with an overview of the topos logic.
While the work is intended as an overview and claims to novelty are minimal, they are
perhaps not entirely non-existent. Theorem 14 is the most general form of [Esa06, Proposition
3] I could think of and Section 4.3 reproves results on extensions of mHC using the framework
of [WZ97; WZ98]; in fact, it seems that Corollary 31 is the first published proof of the
corresponding extension of the Blok-Esakia Theorem announced in [Esa06].
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Table 1: Axioms for Ki
Axioms of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, see, e.g., [CZ97, Sec. 1.3,(A1)-(A9)]
Axiom for 2
(nrm) 2(A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B)
Inference rule for Lint-fragment Inference rule for modality
MP
A→ B, A
B
NEC
A
2A
Remark 1. As a part of a larger project, I formalized most of syntactic derivations in the
paper—in particular those relevant for Section 5.2— in the Coq proof assistant. Readers
interested in this ongoing project are welcome to contact me. The formalization covers, in
particular, most of material in [Esa98], which prepared the proof-theoretical background
for [EJP00] and inspired the title of this paper.
2 A Primer on Intuitionistic Modalities
Modal formulas over a supply of propositional variables Σ are defined by
A,B ::= ⊥ | p | A→ B | A ∧B | A ∨B | 2A
where p ∈ Σ. The set is denoted by L2intΣ, but unless explicitly stated otherwise, I will
keep Σ fixed throughout and drop it from the notation. The purely intuitionistic language
(i.e., without 2) will be denoted by Lint. Note that the syntax extended with a 3 operator,
intuitionistically not definable from 2, is of no interest for us here.
Γ ⊆ L2int is a normal L2int-logic or an intuitionistic normal modal logic if it is closed under
rules and axioms from Table 1 plus the rule of substitution. For any Γ,∆ ⊆ L2int, Γ ⊕ ∆
will denote the closure of Γ ∪∆ under substitution and the rules MP and NEC. In the case
of ∆ = {α}, I will also write Γ ⊕ α. Occasionally, I will write Γ + ∆ for the closure under
substitution and MP, but without NEC. This notation is analogous to the one used in [CZ97].
Ki is the smallest intuitionistic normal modal logic, i.e., IPC⊕(nrm). IPC—the intuitionistic
propositional calculus—can be thus defined as the intersection of Ki and Lint. Table 2 provides
a list of additional axioms and logics which will be of interest to us. GLi, SLi, mHC and KM
are of particular importance. As we see in Table 2 and Figure 1, there are several ways in
which these and related systems can be axiomatized. In particular, we have
Theorem 2 (Ursini [Urs79], following Smorynski for the classical case). The following for-
malisms have the same set of theorems:
1. GLi as defined in Table 2
2. K4i ⊕ 2A→ A
A
3. K4i ⊕ 2A→ A2A
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Table 2: L2int axioms and logics. See, e.g., [Sot84; WZ97; WZ98] for more (also in the syntax
extended with a 3 operator). A below abbreviates A ∧2A
(cl) ((B → A)→ B)→ B (em) A ∨ ¬A
Cl = IPC + (cl) = IPC + (em)
(nrm) 2(A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B) (opr) 2(A ∧B)↔ (2A ∧ 2B)
Ki = IPC⊕ (nrm) = IPC⊕ (opr) Kcl = Ki ⊕ Cl
(trns) 2A→ 22A
K4i = Ki ⊕ (trns) K4cl = K4i ⊕ Cl
(bind) 22A→ 2A C4i = Ki ⊕ (bind)
(r) A→ 2A (fmap) (A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B)
Ri = Ki ⊕ (r) = Ki ⊕ (fmap) Note that above Ri, ⊕ is the same as +
In using the symbol R, I follow [FM97]
(refl) 2A→ A S4i = Ti ⊕ K4i
Ti = Ki ⊕ (refl) Trivi = Ti + Ri
(pll) (A ∨ 22A)→ 2A
PLLi = Ki ⊕ (pll) = C4i ⊕ Ri
(wlo¨b) 2(2A→ A)→ 2A (henk) (A↔ 2A)→ A
(ufp) (B ↔ A[B/p])→ ((C ↔ A[C/p])→ (B ↔ C))
GLi = Ki ⊕ (wlo¨b) = K4i ⊕ (henk) = K4i ⊕ (ufp)
(see Theorem 2 below) GLcl = GLi ⊕ Cl
(slo¨b) (2A→ A)→ A (glb) (2A→ A)→ 2A
SLi = Ki ⊕ (slo¨b) = Ki ⊕ (glb) = GLi + Ri
The form (glb) comes from Goldblatt [Gol81]
(grz) 2(2(A→ 2A)→ A)→ 2A (sgrz) 2(2(A→ 2A)→ A)→ A
wGrzcl = K4cl ⊕ (grz) sGrzcl = Kcl ⊕ (sgrz)
Note we only consider here classical variants of (grz)
(next) 2A→ (((B → A)→ B)→ B) (derv) 2A→ ((B → A) ∨B)
CBi = Ki ⊕ (next) = Ki ⊕ (derv)
CBi stands for Cantor-Bendixson, see Sec. 4 mHC = Ri + CBi
CBLi = CBi ⊕ GLi KM = CBi ⊕ SLi
KM = SLi + CBi = SLi + mHC
(gd) (A→ B) ∨ (B → A) LC = IPC + (gd)
.3 2(A→ B) ∨ 2(B → A)
(ver) 2A (boxbot) 2⊥
Veri = Ki ⊕ (ver) = Ki ⊕ (boxbot)
(nnv) ¬¬2⊥ (nv) ¬2⊥
NNVi = Ki ⊕ (nnv) NVi = Ki ⊕ (nv)
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see [KM86]
Figure 1: Relationships between systems introduced in Table 2. Ordinary arrows correspond to inclusion between
systems. Lines joined by ⊕ denote joins: a join of two logics is of course the smallest normal modal logic
containing both. Remember however that not all joins are shown , especially in case of joins with weak
systems like K4i or NNVi. For more on wGrzcl, see [Esa06] and also [Lit07] and further references therein.
The observation that Trivcl and Vercl are the only maximal consistent logics in Ki seems to have been made
first by Vakarelov in [Vak81]. Wolter [Wol97] is one of most advanced studies of the lattice of extensions
of Ki; in particular, it solves a number of problem posed in [Vak81] and investigates the counterparts of
Γcl above Ki for any given Γ. Finally, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [WZ97; WZ98] show how to reinterpret
this lattice as the lattice of extensions of a certain bimodal classical logic. This is in many ways the most
general of Blok-Esakia type results as will be discussed later in Section 4.3.
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4. K4i ⊕ (ufp) = (B ↔ A[B/p])→ ((C ↔ A[C/p])→ (B ↔ C))
5. K4i ⊕ (henk) = (A↔ 2A)→ A
A variable p ∈ Σ is 2-guarded in A ∈ L2int if all its occurrences are within the scope of 2.
This notion will be used repeatedly in connection with GLi and its extensions.
Remark 3. Equalities in Table 2 and joins in Figure 1 should be in fact treated as a
large lemma on interderivability for a number of intuitionistic normal modal axioms. Of
particular interest for this chapter are: the derivability of (r) from (slo¨b), which mirrors
derivability of (trns) from (wlo¨b); interderivability between (glb) and (slo¨b); equivalence
between either of these and the conjunction of (wlo¨b) and (r); two different ways of
axiomatizing CBi by using (next) and (derv). All these statements are made assuming Ki.
All normal 2int-logics as defined above—more precisely, their associated global consequence
relations—are strongly finitely algebraizable; see standard references like [BP89; Fon06; FJP03;
FJP09; Ras74] for basic notions of algebraic logic and a more detailed discussion. Strong fi-
nite algebraizability also applies to normal logics in any fragment of 2int containing →. This
is due to the fact that all these systems are implicative logics in the sense of Rasiowa [Ras74].
Given a normal logic Γ, I will call the corresponding class of algebras obtained via the alge-
braization process Γ-algebras, e.g., Ki-algebras, GLi-algebras, wGrzcl-algebras etc. Ki-algebras
are obviously special cases of HAOs—Heyting algebras with operators—namely HAOs with a
single unary operator. Recall that an operator on a Heyting algebra is an operation preserving
> and finite meets. An operator on a Heyting algebra which turns it into a Γ-algebra will be
called a Γ-operator.
Finally, recall that for any algebra H, a H-polynomial is a term in the similarity type of H
enriched with a separate constant for each element of H [BS81, Definition 13.3]. In my notation
for polynomials, I will not distinguish between an element of H and its corresponding constant.
Moreover, I will use elements of Σ (i.e., propositional variables) as variables of polynomials,
consistent with the general policy of blurring the distinction between logical formulas and
algebraic terms. The notion of 2-guardedness for polynomials will be used in the same way
as for formulas.
2.1 Relational Semantics
It is pretty obvious what should be the ingredients of a Kripke frame (a relational structure) for
intuitionistic normal modal logic: it should be of the form (W,unlhd,≺), where unlhd is a poset order
used to interpret intuitionistic connectives, whereas ≺ is the modal accessibility relation used
to interpret 2. Valuations of propositional variables should be defined as as V : Σ→ Upunlhd (W )
and the inductive extension to intuitionistic connectives using unlhd is standard. However, once
we set to provide a precise interpretation of modalities, there are choices to be made. Here is
what [Sim94, Section 3.3]—one of most comprehensive overviews—says on the subject:
One could take also the usual satisfaction clauses for the modalities in modal mod-
els . . . However, an essential feature of intuitionistic models is the monotonicity
lemma . . . If the standard satisfaction clauses for the modalities are used then the
monotonicity lemma does not hold. There are two possible remedies. (a) One is
to modify the satisfaction clauses. This might be a reasonable thing to do, for
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one might wish to use the partial order to give a more intuitionistic reading of the
modalities. (b) The other remedy is to impose conditions on models that ensure
that the monotonicity lemma does hold.
The monotonicity lemma referred to in the above is of course the fact that the denotation
of any intuitionistic formula in any Kripke model is upward closed. The two solutions lead
to two alternative satisfaction definitions:
• 2(a)A := {w ∈W | ∀v, x.(w unlhd v and v ≺ x implies x ∈ A)}
• 2(b)A := {w ∈W | ∀x.(w ≺ x implies x ∈ A)}
By definition, 2(a)A ∈ Upunlhd (W ) for any A ⊆ W . This, however, is easily seen to fail
in general for (b) , even for some A ∈ Upunlhd (W ). This is precisely while we need to impose
additional conditions on the interaction of unlhd and ≺ :
Lemma 4 ([BD84]). For any (W, unlhd , ≺ ), the condition
for any A ∈ Upunlhd (W ), 2(b)A ∈ Upunlhd (W )
(i.e., Upunlhd (W ) is a subalgebra of Pow(W ) also with respect to 2(b) ) is satisfied iff the following
condition holds: unlhd ; ≺⊆≺ ; unlhd (1)
Curiously, condition (1), even though isolated in [BD84] and discussed in references such as
[Sim94], does not seem to appear too often in intuitionistic modal literature. Most references,
even those which adopt interpretation (b) , assume conditions stronger than (1). Goldblatt
[Gol81] requires unlhd ; ≺⊆≺ (2)
but in most of intuitionistic modal logic literature (see, e.g., [Sot84; WZ97; WZ98]) we have
still stronger unlhd ; ≺ ; unlhd =≺ (3)
Obviously, (3) implies (2) and (2) implies (1), as unlhd is a partial order. But as noted in
[BD84; Gol81]
≺ ; unlhd =≺ (4)
(i.e., for any x, ≺ −1[x] is upward closed) cannot be forced by any axiom, as any frame
(W, unlhd , ≺ ) can be shown to be semantically equivalent to (W, unlhd , ≺ ′) satisfying (4) by
putting ≺ ′ =≺ ; unlhd .
In presence of (4), (1) implies (3) and hence all these conditions become equivalent. Thus,
we can follow the others and assume (3), but from a logical point view, only (1) would be
necessary.
Remark 5. A justification for adopting the strongest condition (3) is provided by com-
pleteness/canonicity result, for which the earliest references seem to be [BD84; Sot84]:
when we define ≺ between prime filters of a Heyting algebra with a normal 2 in a stan-
dard way, the resulting Kripke frame will satisfy (3). This provides a justification of (3)
and a bridge between algebraic and Kripke semantics, i.e., a completeness result for Ki
wrt Kripke frames satisfying (3) with 2 read as dictated by (b) .
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Remark 6. What is the connection with (a) -semantics? It is easy to see that (a) -
reading of 2 wrt ≺ yields the same operator on Upunlhd (W ) as (b) -reading wrt ≺ modified
to satisfy (2): that is, the closure of ≺ under pre-composition with unlhd . Note here that
in order to obtain a relation satisfying (3), one needs to close ≺ under both pre- and
post-composition with unlhd .
Thus, as stated in [Sim94]
it turns out that both semantics induce the same intuitionistic modal logic. . . . Only
when the3 connective is added do the differences in the semantics become apparent.
The reason why (a) is often seen in the literature (see [Sim94] and references therein and
also, e.g, [AMPR01; PS86]) is that it becomes pretty natural when intuitionistic modal logic
is considered as a fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic—and, in close connection, when
one wants to interpret 3 using the same relation as for 2. However, this is not what we are
interested in here. Thus, in what follows, I stick to (b) reading of modality (henceforth (b)
is dropped as a subscript) and impose condition (3) on all frames. This is justified not only
by Remark 5 above, but also by the fact that intuitionistic modal semantics in practically all
references relevant for further discussion satisfied (3) anyway. Let us summarize the discussion
above with the following definition:
A Kripke frame or a relational structure is of the form (W, unlhd , ≺ ), where
• unlhd is a poset order used to interpret intuitionistic connectives
• ≺ is the modal accessibility relation used to interpret 2 and
• unlhd ; ≺⊆≺ , where ; is relation composition
A valuation is a mapping V : Σ → Upunlhd (W ), where Upunlhd (W ) is the Heyting algebra of
upward closed sets of W and the inductive extension to L2intΣ is standard.
Remark 7. When at least one of lattice connectives is removed, the situation at first
sight appears more complicated. While the papers proving the separation property of IPC
[Hor62; Mil10; Pra65] showed that its reducts remain complete wrt relational semantics,
a Stone-type representation theorem for arbitrary algebras would seem more problematic;
the one for Heyting algebras relies crucially on the fact that they have distributive lattice
reducts. However, a series of papers beginning with [Ko¨h81] and finishing with [BJ13]
established that Brouwerian semilattices enjoy in fact Stone-, Priestley- and Esakia-type
dualities.
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Remark 8. It is worth discussing whether we can reconstruct this relational semantics
from coalgebraic point of view, just like in the classical case. The relationship between
the category of Heyting algebras (HA) and the category of posets with bounded morphisms
(say, PABM) is the same as in the case of boolean algebras and sets (dual adjunction,
restricting to equivalence in the finite case). Kripke frames for classical modal logic can
be thought as coalgebras for covariant powerset functor. The counterpart of that functor
in PABMis the covariant upset functor Upunlhd (·), which sends (W, unlhd ) to (Upunlhd (W ),⊇)
and Upunlhd (f)(A) = f [A]. Then if we attempt to define relational structures as PABM-
morphisms, i.e., bounded morphisms from (W, unlhd ) to (Upunlhd (W ),⊇), the very choice
of codomain of this morphism forces (4) and the forth condition of bounded morphism
becomes precisely (2), so altogether we get just (3). However, the back condition seems
to impose a rather special condition on ≺ : for any x ∈ W and any upward closed
A ⊆≺ −1[x], there is y s.t. x unlhd y and ≺ −1[y] = A. There are many natural examples
of structures satisfying (3) where this condition would fail and in general I do not know
how many logics would be possibly complete with respect to frames of this kind. It is
not necessarily harmless for some of the axioms considered here. However, when we can
forget about the back condition for morphisms (i.e., in case of modalities over distributive
lattices rather than over Heyting algebras), (3) emerges as the natural basic semantic
condition also from the coalgebraic point of view.
Table 3 lists semantic conditions corresponding to modal axioms. For GLi in particular, we
have:
Theorem 9 ([Urs79]). A structure (W, unlhd , ≺ ) validates GLi iff
• ≺ is transitive, i.e., ≺ ; ≺ ⊆ ≺ and
• ≺ is Upunlhd (W )-Noetherian: for any A ∈ Upunlhd (W ), if A 6= W , then there is w ∈ 2A−A,
i.e., a 2-maximal non-A point
Proof (sketch). We show only the ”if” direction. Assuming (wlo¨b) fails under a valuation V ,
take B to be the extension of (wlo¨b) under V and show that 2B ⊆ B. This means that
W −B witnesses the failure of Noetherianity.
Note that Theorem 9 together with the (r) row of Table 3 provides also the condition for
SLi: as already stated in Table2 and Figure 1, SLi is obtained as GLi⊕ (r), so one simply takes
the conjunction of the two conditions.
[Urs79] provides an interesting motivation for this semantics of GLi in terms of projects and
streamlines in a research. It also provides other important results, such as the finite model
property and decidability.
3 The Fixpoint Theorem
Theorem 2 above gave us several equivalent axiomatizations of GLi. In particular, (ufp) forces
uniqueness of fixed points.
Definition 10. Let B be a formula of L2int (its denotation in a given algebra and under a
given valuation). B is a fixed point of (the term function associated with) A ∈ L2int relative
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Table 3: Semantic counterparts of intuitionistic modal axioms. See, e.g., [Dosˇ85; Sot84;
WZ97; WZ98] for more. ∆ := {(w,w) | w ∈ W} and  := unlhd − ∆, i.e., it is
the strict version of the intuitionistic poset order. For R ∈ { ≺ , unlhd }, V ⊆ W ,
V R↑:= {w ∈W | ∃v ∈ V.vRw} and V R↓:= {w ∈W | ∃v ∈ V.wRv}
Axiom Semantic condition Axiom Semantic condition Axiom Semantic condition
(cl) unlhd = ∆ (trns) ≺ ; ≺ ⊆ ≺ (bind) ≺ ⊆ ≺ ; ≺
(r) ≺ ⊆ unlhd (refl) unlhd ⊆ ≺ (wlo¨b) see Theorem 9
(next)  ⊆ ≺ (ver) ≺= ∅ (nv) W ≺ ↓= W
(nnv) (W −W ≺ ↓) unlhd ↓= W
to p in a given normal logic Γ (here always an extension of GLi) if B ↔ A[B/p] ∈ Γ and p
does not occur in B.
According to [Smo79], the fact that (ufp) holds in GLcl was discovered independently by
Bernardi, Sambin and de Jongh. We know thus that, surprisingly, in GLi a syntactic fixed
point of an expression is unique up to equivalence whenever it exists; same applies to all of
its extensions, such as SLi or KM. But do they exist at all? An even more amazing fact is
that they not only do exist—under the assumption of 2-guardedness on p—but are effectively
computable. This is guaranteed by the following algebraic (or propositional, if one prefers)
variant of Go¨del’s Diagonalization Lemma. Sambin [Sam76] proved it for GLi itself and de
Jongh proved it for GLcl building on an earlier result by Smorynski, another proof being found
soon afterwards by Boolos; the reader is referred to [Boo93; BS91; Mur14; Smo79] for more
on its history and the connection with Go¨del’s result:
Theorem 11 (Diagonalization). For any A and p, there exists a constructively obtained
formula diagpA s.t.
1. diagpA ↔ B ∈ GLi, where B is obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of p under2 by diagpA
2. A and diagpA have provably the same fixed points with respect to p, that is, for any C
not containing p we have
(C ↔ A[C/p])↔ (C ↔ diagpA[C/p]) ∈ GLi
Clearly, if p is 2-guarded in A, then B in the first clause is precisely A[diagpA/p] and
diagpA does not contain p, hence being trivially its own fixed point wrt p. Thus, in such a
situation diagpA itself is also the unique fixed-point of A with respect to p!
Proof of Theorem 11, sketch. We only give a sketch of how diagpA is constructed. Any for-
mula A(p, q) ∈ L2int in variables p, q ∈ Σ can be written as B(2C1(p, q), . . . ,2Ck(p, q), p, q),
where B ∈ Lint (i.e., is a formula without 2) and C ∈ L2int. Clearly, if k = 0, then A itself
belongs to Lint and, in particular, there are no occurrences of p under 2. Hence we can take
diagpA to be A itself. Otherwise, the proof can be conducted by induction on k, as we already
have the base step. For any i ≤ k, set
Ai := B(2C1(p, q), . . . ,2Ci−1(p, q),>,2Ci+1(p, q), . . . ,2Ck(p, q), p, q).
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By definition, the inductive hypothesis applies to Ai. Now we set
diagpA := B(2C1(diagpA1/p, q), . . . ,2Ck(diagpAk/p, q), p, q).
Remark 12. In fact, extensions of SLi—in particular KM—allow a much simpler proof of
Theorem 11 and a much simpler algorithm for computing these fixpoints: it is enough to
substitute > for p. This follows already from observations made by Smorynski in [Smo79,
Lemma 2.3] and has been discussed explicitly in [JV95, Propositions 4.2–4.6]. De Jongh
and Visser describe SLi as a kind of Kindergarten Theory in which all the well-known
syntactical results of Provability Logic have extremely simple versions.
Remark 13. It is known that at least in the case of GLcl a non-constructive and non-
explict form of Theorem 11 can be obtained already from uniqueness of fixed-points com-
bined with the Beth definability theorem for GLcl, see, e.g., [Boo93; Smo79] for more
information. However, as should be clear from the discussion below, the very fact that
fixed points are obtained explicitly and constructively seems an advantage not to be given
up lightly.
Theorem 11 has a nice algebraic corollary. I present it here as a more general version of
[Esa06, Proposition 3].
Theorem 14. A K4i-algebra H is a GLi-algebra iff every H-polynomial t(p) in one 2-guarded
variable p ∈ Σ has a fixed point.
Proof. The “only if” direction. This is a direct corollary of Theorem 11.
The “if” direction. Given any h ∈ H, consider the polynomial t(p) = 2p → h. As p is2-guarded in it, it has a fixed point ih ∈ H; that is, ih = 2ih → h. By the fact that →
is conjugate (or residual) to ∧, one half of this equality is equivalent to ih ∧ 2ih ≤ h. On
the other hand, h ≤ 2ih → h = ih by general implication laws. Taken together, these two
inequalities imply ih ∧2ih = h ∧2h: the ≤ direction from the first inequality, normality and
(trns), the ≥ direction from the second inequality and monotonicity of 2. Using normality
again, we get 2ih ∧ 22ih = 2h ∧ 22h and using (trns) again, we arrive at 2ih = 2h. Then
we get 2(2h→ h) = 2(2ih → h) = 2ih = 2h. As h ∈ H was chosen arbitrarily, we have that
H is a GLi-algebra.
There is an analogy between the above result and alternative axiomatizations for GLi pre-
sented in [Urs79].
Corollary 15.
• A Ri-algebra H is a SLi-algebra iff every H-polynomial t(p) in one 2-guarded variable
p ∈ Σ has a fixed point.
• [Esa06, Proposition 3] A mHC-algebra H is a KM-algebra iff every H-polynomial t(p) in
one 2-guarded variable p ∈ Σ has a fixed point.
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As stated above, Theorem 11 occurred first as an algebraization of Go¨del’s Diagonalization
Lemma. While the connection between GLi and Heyting Arithmetic HA is not as tight
as the one between GLcl and Peano Arithmetic PA established by the completeness result
of Solovay [Sol76] (see also [Boo93, Chapter 9]), [Sam76] notes that Theorem 11 yields a
counterpart of the Diagonalization Lemma for any intuitionistic first-order theory with a
canonical derivability predicate, including obviously HA. At any rate, the relevance of fixpoint
results for Lo¨b-like logics is not limited to arithmetic.
Remark 16. It is worth mentioning here that—unlike the case of PA—the search for a
complete axiomatization of the provability logic of HA is not over yet; [Iem01] gives a
fascinating account. Regarding the arithmetical interpretation of SLi, see the discussion
of HA∗ in [JV95, Sec. 4–5].
To begin with, in the classical case one can use Theorem 11 to show that explicit smallest
or greatest fixed-point operators are eliminable over GLcl. In other words, adding µ or ν does
not increase the expressive power of the classical modal logic of transitive and conversely well-
founded structures; see [AF09; Ben06; Vis05]. Note that this includes all correctly formed
expressions with µ, without assuming that all occurrences of p are 2-guarded: as usual,
they only have to be positive. [CFL10, Section 3] discusses an application in the context of
expressivity of navigational fragments of XML query languages.
While I am not aware of an exact analogue of the results in [AF09; Ben06; Vis05] in the
intuitionistic context,1 Lo¨b-like modalities—more specifically, variants of systems GLi and
SLi—have recently become rather popular in type theory. Examples include:
• modality for recursion [Nak00; Nak01]
• approximation modality [AMRV07]
• guardedness type constructor [AM13]
• next-step modality/next clock tick [KB11a; KB11b]
• later operator [BT09; BM13; BMSS12; JTS12]
One of reasons is precisely that such modalities guarantee existence and uniqueness of
fixed-points of suitably guarded type expressions. However, the modal spadework of 1970’s
seems rarely acknowledged. In [Nak00], which may be credited with introducing intuitionistic
Lo¨b-like modalities to the attention of this community, we find the following statement:
Similar results concerning the existence of fixed points of proper type expressions
. . . could historically go back to the fixed point theorem of the logic of provability
. . . The difference is that our logic is intuitionistic, and fixed points are treated as
sets of realizers [the emphasis is mine–T.L.].
This formulation suggests that Nakano was not aware that the intuitionistic fixed-point
theorem had been already proved in [Sam76], not to mention improvements possible above
SLi (cf. Remark 12). The only related references quoted in [Nak00] focus on classical GLcl—
e.g, [Boo93]—and in later papers even these are omitted. A valuable part of the logical
tradition seems lost this way. Let us see what insights can be found in the work of the Tbilisi
school.
1It is a theme I am presently collaborating on with Albert Visser.
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4 Leo Esakia and Extensions of mHC
4.1 mHC and Topological Derivative
Leo Esakia and collaborators devoted special attention to the system mHC and its extensions.
[Esa06] is an excellent overview. The abbreviation mHC stood for modalized Heyting calculus.
The reader may find the name surprising; after all, many natural intuitionistic modal systems
are not subsystems of mHC. Esakia [Esa06] was perfectly aware of that:
The postulate (r) is not typical, while the postulate (derv) stresses even more “non-
standardness” of the chosen basic system mHC and of its extension KM, which
enables one to draw a conventional “demarcation line” between mHC and the stan-
dard intuitionistic modal logics.
Remark 17. Both axioms seem “nonstandard” mostly if one focuses on these intuition-
istic modal logics which are obtained from popular classical systems. It is enough to look
at Table 3 to realize why it must be so: (derv) is trivially derivable in Kcl (its consequent
being a classical tautology), while the combination of (cl) and (r) yields that ≺⊆ ∆. That
is, the only classical frames for Rcl are disjoint unions of reflexive and irreflexive points.
However, (r) is nowhere as pathological in a properly intuitionistic setting. There are
many references on systems different from mHC and KM where nevertheless (r) is still
derivable or even explicitly included as an axiom. A short and inexhaustive list includes
[Aba07; Acz01; BBP98; BMSS12; Cur52; FM97; GA08; GP06; Gol81; Gol10; KB11b;
MP08; Nak00; Nak01]. They can be split roughly into two main groups. The first one—
e.g., [BMSS12; KB11b; Nak00; Nak01]—concerns SLi and has already been mentioned in
Section 3. The second one—e.g., [Acz01; BBP98; Cur52; FM97; GA08; GP06; Gol81;
Gol10]—concerns the system which is denoted here as PLLi (a.k.a. CL, see [BBP98]).
[Gol03, Section 7.6] and [Gol10] are good if incomplete overviews of most relevant pa-
pers on this system—the most important omissions being perhaps [PD01, Section 7] and
[Aba07; GP06]. See also [MP08] for a discussion of type systems with Ri modalities from
programmer’s point of view.
[Esa06] gives the following reasons for the importance of mHC:
• Its connection to KM: mHC is KM minus the Lo¨b axiom (slo¨b). Note that (wlo¨b) and
(slo¨b) are equivalent in the presence of (r)
• The connection with intuitionistic temporal logic “Always & Before” possessing rich
expressive possibilities
• The fact that mHC can be obtained as a fragment of QINT (or, in Esakia’s notation,
QHC)—quantified intuitionistic propositional calculus. This is similar to the encoding
of mHC in the internal language of a topos, see the last point
• The topological connection with Cantor’s scattered spaces, notions of the limit and iso-
lated point. This will be discussed at length in this section
• Finally, as mentioned above, mHC turns out to be a natural fragment of the topos logic.
This last point builds on all the preceding ones and will be discussed in Sec. 5
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As we can see in Table 3, the conditions on the accessibility relation ≺ imposed by the
axioms of mHC—the combination of (r) and (derv)—is  ⊆≺⊆ unlhd . A natural question to
ask is whether it is possible to enforce syntactically that ≺ is even more closely determined
by unlhd as one of the two borderline cases, i.e., either ≺= unlhd or ≺=  .
For ≺ = unlhd , the answer is obviously positive. This is achieved precisely by the axioms
of the logic Trivi, strengthening (derv) to (refl). In fact, this is a semantic counterpart of an
observation in [Esa06] that enriching any Heyting algebra with a trivial operator 2Trivix := x
yields an mHC-algebra. Note here that whenever 2 is an mHC- or even Ri-operator, its
associated  is a Trivi-operator.
For ≺= , the answer is obviously negative. Irreflexivity is a typical example of a condition
which cannot be defined by any purely modal axiom, see [BdV01]. Here is perhaps the most
natural proof.
Example 18. Consider a frame for mHC defined as (ω, unlhd ,  ) where unlhd is the natural
order ≤ on ω. The dual algebra contains as a subalgebra the two-element Boolean algebra
with 2⊥ = ⊥, which is the dual of a single ≺ -reflexive point. Hence, no modal axiom can
define the class of ≺ -irreflexive frames over the class of frames for mHC.
However, an “irreflexive” mHC-operator is clearly definable on any Heyting algebra obtained
as the dual of an intuitionistic Kripke frame (W, unlhd ): for any A ∈ Upunlhd (W ), we take >A :=
{w ∈ W | {w}unlhd ↑ −{w} ⊆ A}; again, see Table 3 for notation. It is straightforward to note
that for any w ∈ W , w ∈ >A iff for any B ∈ Upunlhd (W ), w ∈ (B → A) ∪ B. This observation
actually explains the shape of axiom (derv). Hence, given any complete Heyting algebra H,
define its point-free coderivative [EJP00; Sim82; Sim14] as >h :=
∧
i∈H
(i ∨ (i→ h)).
Proposition 19. For any complete Heyting algebra, its point-free coderivative is an mHC-
operator.
Proof. A rather easy exercise for the reader; can be also extracted from the proof of [Esa06,
Proposition 5].
There is a slightly different description of >. Take a Heyting algebra H and h, i ∈ H s.t.
i ≤ h. h is i-dense or dense in [i,>] if for any j ∈ H, we get that h ∧ j = i implies j = i. Note
that the standard topological notion of density can be considered a special case: an open set
is topologically dense iff it is ⊥-dense in the Heyting algebra of open sets of the space. The
following was observed, e.g., in [EJP00]:
Fact 20. For any Heyting algebra H and any h ≥ i ∈ H, h is i-dense iff there exists j ∈ H s.t.
h = j ∨ (j→ i).
Corollary 21. For any complete Heyting algebra H and any i ∈ H,
>i =
∧
{h ∈ H | h ≥ i and h is i-dense}.
Why coderivative? The reader is referred to a detailed account by Simmons [Sim14]. Briefly,
recall that in topology the Cantor-Bendixson derivative of a set A is the set of those x
whose every neighbourhood contains a point of A other than x; the dual operator (hence
co-derivative) consists of those x which have an open neighbourhood entirely contained in
A ∪ {x} [Esa06]. As it turns out, this indeed coincides with > for practically all sensible
topological spaces:
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Theorem 22 (Simmons). For any T0-space, its co-derivative operator coincides with the
point-free coderivative > on the Heyting algebra of open sets.
Proof. For > defined as in Corollary 21, this was proved in [Sim82].
Obviously, as any intuitionistic Kripke frame with the Alexandroff topology given by
Upunlhd (W ) is T0, we get that > coincides with the dual of topological derivative of this topology.
It is, in fact, easier to prove directly than by Simmons’ result.
Remark 23. One observation from [Sim82] is worth quoting here:
for non-T0-spaces the usual definition of isolated point does not quite capture
the intended notion
and hence for arbitrary spaces, the point-free definition of derivative given by > seems in
fact more adequate than the standard one. The reader can verify this by extending the
definition of intuitionistic Kripke frames to qosets rather than just posets and checking
how both notions would fare in such a setting.
4.2 KM and Scatteredness
A complete Heyting algebra will be called scattered if its coderivative > is not only an mHC-
operator, but a KM-operator. Recall Corollary 15 as an algebraic characterization of such a
situation.
Proposition 24.
• For any topological space, its point-free coderivative is a KM-operator if the space is
scattered in the usual sense: that is, if each non-empty subset has an isolated point
• For any T0 topological space, its point-free coderivative is a KM-operator only if the
space is scattered
Proof. A non-T0-space can never be scattered, and for T0-spaces, the point-free coderivative
coincides with ordinary one as stated in Theorem 22. The remaining calculations are an
exercise in point-set topology; in fact, the point-set part of this result has been shown first
by Kuznetsov [Kuz79; Mur14]. One can use an alternative characterization of scatteredness
here: for any open set A distinct from the whole space, >A−A is non-empty.
Let us summarize some of the results above:
Corollary 25. A topological space T is scattered iff in the complete Heyting algebra of open
sets of T, every polynomial in one >-guarded variable has a fixed point.
Corollary 26. The following are equivalent for any (W, unlhd , ≺ ):
• ≺=  and the Alexandroff topology (W, Upunlhd (W )) is scattered
• (W, unlhd , ≺ ) is a frame for KM
• ≺=  and it contains no infinite ascending chains
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Proof. We only need to prove the equivalence of the last two conditions.  ⊆ ≺ is, as
observed, enforced by mHC. Theorem 9 gives the corresponding semantic condition for (wlo¨b).
Quite obviously, Upunlhd (W )-Noetherianity forces irreflexivity of ≺ . Thus, whenever (W, unlhd , ≺
) is a frame for KM (that is, the join of mHC and GLi), we have ≺ =  . Moreover,
rewriting the condition of Upunlhd (W )-Noetherianity for mHC-frames, we obtain that for any
A ∈ Upunlhd (W ) − {W}, there is w ∈ A ↑ −A. Rewriting further, we obtain that any B 6= ∅
s.t. B = B unlhd ↓ has a maximal element wrt unlhd . But this means that any nonempty subset of
W has a maximal unlhd -element.
4.3 Completeness, Lattice Isomorphisms and Bimodal Translations
Two important kinds of results have been missing from this overview so far. First, while I
discussed Kripke correspondence for modal logics (Table 3, Theorem 9 and Corollary 26), I
have not discussed completeness. Second, I have not said much about lattices of extensions
of Lo¨b-like logics and their relatives—in particular, about generalizations of the Blok-Esakia
Theorem.
This section fixes both oversights. Rather than using original proofs of Kuznetsov, Mu-
ravitsky (for KM) and Esakia (for mHC), we are going to use corollaries of Wolter and Za-
kharyaschev’s results on bimodal translations [WZ97; WZ98], briefly discussed also in [WZ14,
Section 4]. Their techniques allow to interpret intuitionistic modal logics as fragments of clas-
sical polymodal ones (cf. the discussion of implict vs. explicit epistemics in [Ben91]). In the
case of the Blok-Esakia theorem for mHC, we will be able to see why axioms of mHC and wGrzcl
have to look the way they look in order to allow the classical counterpart to be unimodal
rather than polymodal, as it happens in the more general framework of [WZ97; WZ98].
Take the bimodal language Li,m with operators [ i ] and [m]. For any formula A ∈ L2int, I will
write A[ i ] (respectively A[m]) for A with all occurrences of 2 replaced with [ i ] (respectively
[m]). [m] is the default counterpart of the original modality 2 and [ i ] encodes the intuitionistic
poset order, hence the notation.2 The logic S4cli,m is the normal logic axiomatized by the
following axioms: (cl), (nrm)[ i ], (refl)[ i ], (trns)[ i ] and (nrm)[m]; in other words, it is what
modal logicians would describe as the fusion of S4cli and K
cl
m. The logic S4M
cl
i,m is S4
cl
i,m
extended with
(mix) : [m]A↔ [ i ][m][ i ]A.
The logic sGrzMcli,m is S4
cl
i,m extended with (mix) and (sgrz)[ i ]. The translation [ : L2int →
Li,m prefixes every subformula in (·)[m] with [ i ]. Of course, many occurrences of [ i ] in the
translation [A can be removed relative to logics defined above:
Fact 27. The following equivalences belong to S4cli,m: [A ↔ [ i ][A, [(A ∧ B) ↔ ([A ∧ [B),
[(A ∨B)↔ ([A ∨ [B); in S4Mcli,m, we moreover have [(2A)↔ [m][A.
For any intuitionistic normal modal logic Γ ⊇ S4cli,m and any bimodal normal logic ∆ ⊆ Li,m,
let
• τmixΓ := S4Mcli,m ⊕ {[A | A ∈ Γ}
• σmixΓ := τmixΓ⊕ (sgrz)[ i ]
• ρin∆ := {A ∈ L2int | [A ∈ ∆}
2The reader has to be warned that the notation in this section differs somewhat from that in references like
[WZ97; WZ98; WZ14].
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∆ is a Li,m-companion of Γ if for any A ∈ L2int, A ∈ Γ iff [A ∈ ∆, i.e., iff ρin∆ = Γ.
Theorem 28 ([WZ97; WZ98; WZ14]). Let ∆ ⊇ S4cli,m be a normal bimodal logic and Γ ⊆ L2int
be an intuitionistic normal logic. Then
(A) ρin∆ is an intuitionistic normal modal logic
(B) τmixΓ and σmixΓ are, respectively, the smallest and the greatest Li,m-companions of Γ
containing (mix)
(C) ρin preserves decidability, Kripke completeness and the finite model property. If (mix) ∈
∆, ρin also preserves canonicity
(D) τmix preserves canonicity
(E) σmix preserves the finite model property
(F) σmix is an isomorphism from the lattice of normal extensions of Ki onto the lattice of
normal extensions of sGrzMcli,m
(G) Γ ⊇ K4i has the finite model property whenever its Li,m-companions over S4Mcli,m ⊕
(trns)[m] include a canonical subframe logic
Proof. (A) can be easily proved from Fact 27; note that we need the assumption we are above
S4cli,m. (B) is a consequence of Theorem 27 in [WZ97]. (C) , (D) and (E) are consequences
of Proposition 29 and Theorem 30 in [WZ97] and Theorems 11 and 12 in [WZ98].(F) is a
consequence of Corollary 28 in [WZ97]. (G) is a consequence of Corollary 18 in [WZ98].
[WZ97; WZ98] illustrate on many examples how powerful these results are. As it turns
out, they also have corollaries of immediate interest for us.
Corollary 29. mHC is canonical and has the finite model property.
Proof. First, note that
S4Mcli,m ⊕ [(r) = S4Mcli,m ⊕ ([ i ]A→ [m]A) ⊇ S4Mcli,m ⊕ (trns)[m].
Clearly, [ i ]A→ [m]A is a Sahlqvist formula with an universal FO counterpart. Furthermore,
S4Mcli,m ⊕ [(derv) is the same logic as the extension of S4Mcli,m with
[m]B ∧ 〈 i 〉C → [ i ](〈 i 〉C ∨ [ i ]B). (5)
The latter is a simple Sahlqvist implication (cf. e.g., [BdV01, Definition 3.47]). Applying the
algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3.49 in [BdV01] and doing some FO-preprocessing, we get
an universal formula
∀y, z, w.(x unlhd y ∧ x unlhd z → (z unlhd y ∨ (z unlhd w → x ≺ w))) (6)
(where unlhd is the accessibility relation corresponding to [ i ] and ≺ is the accessibility relation
corresponding to [m]). Thus, τmixmHC is a canonical subframe logic over S4Mcli,m ⊕ (trns)[m].
Now, canonicity of mHC follows from (C) and the fmp from (G) of Theorem 28.
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Remark 30. It is worth noting that the semantic counterpart of (next) from Table 3,
i.e.,  ⊆ ≺ is equivalent to (6) above. For one direction, substitute x = y in (6) and
use poset properties. For the other direction, note that whenever x unlhd y and x unlhd z but
¬(z unlhd y), then x  z, ergo x ≺ z. Now whenever z unlhd w, we can use the interaction
between ≺ and unlhd as expressed by (mix) (in fact, even a weaker axiom would do).
Canonicity of mHC has been noted, e.g., in [Esa06; Gol81]. I was unable to locate references
where the finite model property has been explicitly claimed. The following corollary can
appear more surprising, as bimodal logics over Li,m do not even occur in its statement.
Corollary 31. The lattice of normal extensions of mHC is isomorphic to the lattice of normal
extensions of wGrzcl. The sublattice of normal extensions of KM is isomorphic to the lattice
of normal extensions of GLcl.
Proof. The heart of the proof is to notice that [ i ]A↔ [m]A ∧A and (grz)[m] are derivable in
σmixmHC; in fact, these two formulas axiomatize this logic over Li,m⊕ (trns)[m]. Let us derive
the first of them. For convenience, we will do it in the algebraic setting:
[m]A ∧A ∧ 〈 i 〉¬A ≤ by (refl)[ i ]
[m]A ∧ 〈 i 〉(A ∧ 〈 i 〉¬A) ≤ by (5)
[ i ](〈 i 〉(A ∧ 〈 i 〉¬A) ∨ [ i ]A) ≤ by (refl)[ i ]
[ i ](〈 i 〉(A ∧ 〈 i 〉¬A) ∨A) =
[ i ]([ i ](A→ [ i ]A)→ A) ≤ [ i ]A by (grz)[ i ].
We get that σmixmHC is just a notational variant of σmixwGrzcl, with [m] being 2 and [ i ]
being . This yields the first statement by clause (F) of Theorem 28. For the second, it
is enough to add the observation that over σmixmHC, adding [(slo¨b) is equivalent to adding
(wlo¨b)[m].
The second statement of Corollary 31 above was first proved by Kuznetsov and Muravitsky
in mid-1980’s, see [KM86; Mur14]. The first statement was announced in [Esa06] as follows:
Finally let us note that . . . the lattice Lat(mHC) of all extensions of mHC is iso-
morphic to the lattice Lat(K4.Grz) of all normal extensions of the modal system
K4.Grz. However, a proof of this result requires additional considerations as the
above algebraic machinery does not suffice for it.
It seems that the proof has not been published so far.
Corollary 32 ([Gol81; KM86; Mur81]). KM has the finite model property.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 31 has established that σmixKM is just a notational variant of
GLcl, with [m] being 2 and [ i ] being . Now use clause (C) of Theorem 28 and the finite
model property for GLcl (see, e.g., [BdV01; Boo93; CZ97; Fin85; Mos07] for references).
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Remark 33. Note that we could also prove Corollary 29 in an analogous way to Corollary
32, using the fmp of wGrzcl established explicitly by Amerbauer [Ame96]. The latter is
actually a direct consequence of wGrzcl being a transitive subframe logic [Fin85; Lit07].
However, I believe that the proof of Corollary 29 provided above has some additional
value: we obtained a convenient form of [(derv)—which we actually used in the proof
of Corollary 31—together with its FO translation, which also provides some additional
insight, as discussed in Remark 30.
Remark 34. It could be an interesting exercise—and very much in the spirit of the
Tbilisi school—to show that the above-discussed results of [WZ97; WZ98; WZ14] survive
when the base bimodal logic is weakened from S4cli,m to the fusion of K
cl
i ⊕ (A ∧ [ i ]A →
[ i ][ i ]A) with Kclm and the translation [ is modified to [
∗ replacing every subformula A
with [∗A ∧ [ i ][∗A. On the other hand, it is not obvious how much generality would be
really gained in this way. Note that using Wolter and Zakharyaschev’s original results we
were able to investigate lattices of logics which are not extensions of S4cl, such as wGrzcl
in Corollary 31 above.
5 Scattered Toposes
We are ready to discuss the topos of trees of [BMSS12], scattered toposes of [EJP00] and the
relationship between fixpoint results in both papers.
5.1 Preliminaries on Topos Logic
Just like Section 4.3 assumed certain familiarity with technicalities of modal logic, this section
in turn assumes some familiarity with basics of category theory—mostly with the notions of
a ccc (cartesian closed category), a functor and a natural transformation. Those readers who
know more than that, in particular understand well the internal logic of a topos, can probably
skip this subsection. Due to obvious space constraints, the presentation has to be rather
abstract and example-free; see [Gol06; Joh02; MM92] for more examples and motivation.
Furthermore, like any presentation of topos theory by logicians and for logicians, it can be
accused of neglecting spatial intuitions. See, e.g., [McL90] for a passionate polemic with the
view that toposes were invented to generalize set-theoretical foundations of mathematics.3
Nevertheless, applications of toposes in fields like algebraic geometry or foundations of physics
or their actual historical origins are not directly relevant here. My aim is a minimalist
presentation focusing on the contrast between the logic of a topos and that of a ccc, but also
making clear how the Beth-Kripke-Joyal semantics is related to more familiar ones for the
intuitionistic predicate logic. Of all accounts in the literature, the one in [LS86] is probably
closest to this goal.
3Speaking of [McL90], footnote 4 provides an argument that the plural form intended by Grothendieck was
toposes rather than topoi. I stick to the same convention, also because—as a quick Google search shows—
the form toposes is used mostly by mathematicians, whereas topoi seems prevalent for unrelated notions
in the humanities. Besides, this was the form used by Leo, Mamuka and Dito.
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Let E be a ccc with the terminal object 1 and for any Y ∈ E , let fin!Y be the unique
element of E [Y,1]. I use the obvious notation for (finite) products, coproducts (whenever
they exist, but in a topos they always do), their associated morphisms and I denote the
ccc evaluation mapping BA × A → B as evalA,B. Recall that E is an elementary topos if
there exists an object Ω ∈ E s.t. (Ω,1 true→ Ω) is a subobject classifier, i.e., for any monic
(left-cancellable morphism) Y
f
 X there exists exactly one mapping X χf→ Ω s.t. we have a
pullback diagram:
Y
fin!Y

//
f
J
// X
χf

1
true // Ω
As observed by C. Juul Mikkelsen, this definition already implies that E is bicartesian closed,
where the latter notion is defined as in, e.g., [LS86]; see [Gol06, Section 4.3] for references.
Before we proceed with formal definitions, some general discussion can be helpful. In every
category, topos or not, (equivalence classes of) monics into X are abstract counterparts of
subsets of X; in fact, they are called subobjects of X, just like morphisms 1 → X are global
elements of X. Global elements (or equivalence classes thereof) can be considered as special
cases of subobjects: think of the usual identification of an element x ∈ X with the subset
{x}.4 We can go further and define a generalized element of X as any morphism A → X,
which is then called A-based or defined over A. See [MM92, Section V] for a lucid and brief
discussion of those notions.
In particular, the global elements of Ω can be identified with logical constants, X-based
generalized elements of Ω with predicates over X (i.e., formulas with a single free variable
from X) and n-ary propositional connectives with morphisms Ωn → Ω. Set false := χ fin!0 ,
¬ := χfalse, ∧ := χ〈true,true〉 and ∨ := χ[〈trueΩ,idΩ〉,〈idΩ,trueΩ〉]. Recall that for any X ∈ E ,
trueX stands for true ◦ fin!X and eqX stands for χ〈idX ,idX〉. The latter allows to define
internal equality for generalized elements of type X as σ ≈ τ := eqX ◦ 〈σ, τ〉. That is, if
A
σ→ X and B τ→ X are generalized elements of X, then σ ≈ τ is a generalized element of
Ω defined over A × B. For Ω, we can define not only eqΩ, but also leqΩ as the equalizer of
Ω× Ω
∧ //
Π1
// Ω . Implication, the only remaining intuitionistic connective, can be now defined
as →:= χleqΩ .
Thus, in toposes one can reduce reasoning about the poset of subobjects of any given
object X ∈ E (in fact, whenever E is a topos, this poset is always a lattice and even a
Heyting algebra—see [MM92, Theorem IV.8.1]) to reasoning about E [X,Ω] and further still
to reasoning about an internal Heyting algebra provided by a suitable exponential object.
What this means is: in any category, monics into X have a natural preorder defined as f ⊆ g
if f factors through g, i.e., there is a morphism h s.t. f = g ◦ h. Dividing by equivalence
classes with respect to ⊆, we get a category-theoretic generalization of the poset of subsets
of X ordered by inclusion. In general, without understanding the global structure of E , we
are not likely to learn much about these posets of subobjects. But in a topos, the poset of
subobjects of X is isomorphic to something more tangible: namely, to E [X,Ω], i.e., X-based
generalized elements of Ω. Think of the usual identification of subsets of X with elements of
4Note that toposes very rarely happen to mimic sets in having enough global elements to determine all
subobjects; such special toposes are called well-pointed.
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2X . Here is also where first- and higher-order aspects of the internal logic come into play.
If E is a category with products, a power object ofX ∈ E is a pair (PX,,3 X // 3X // PX ×X)
s.t. for any (Y,R //
r // Y ×X) there exists exactly one Y fr // PX for which there is a
pullback
R

// r
J
// Y ×X
fr×idX
,3 X // 3X // PX ×X
As shown, e.g., in [Gol06, Theorem 4.7.1], in any topos we can take PX to be ΩX and the
subobject ,3 X // 3X // ΩX ×X can be obtained by pulling back true along ΩX ×X evalX,Ω→ Ω.
Thus, we see that in a topos, the notions of power object, subobject classifier and exponential
object are indeed well-matched and we can define the membership predicate σ ∈ τ for a pair
of generalized elements (A
σ→ X,B τ→ PX) as evalX,Ω ◦ 〈τ, σ〉. We are now ready for a single
definition formalizing the whole discussion above and more (see [MM92, Sec. VI.5-7] and also
[Cro93; LS86]):
Definition 35 (The Mitchell-Be`nabou languague). Consider a topos E . The collection of
ground types and the signature of the Mitchell-Be`nabou language of E are defined, respec-
tively, as
Ground(E ) :={E | E ∈ E }
Sg(E ) :={f : F1, . . . , Fn → E | f ∈ E [F1 × · · · × Fn, E]}
(instead of k : 1 → E I will write k : E) and the full collection of types Types(E ) is
A,B ::= E | 1 | Ω | A×B | BA where E ∈ Ground(E ). ΩA can be also written as PA. Fix,
moreover, a supply of term variables x, y, z · · · ∈ tVar. The collection of terms Terms(E ) over
Sg(E ) is defined as
M,N ::= x | fM | fin! |M ≈ N | 〈M,N〉 | Π1M | Π2M | λx : A.M |M oN
where x ∈ tVar and f ∈ Sg(E ) is of suitable arity. The typing rules and some standard
abbreviations (including all logical connectives) of the language are defined in Table 4. Inter-
pretation of types, contexts and terms-in-context in E is given in Table 5.
Definition 36 (Forcing for an elementary topos). Assume Γ = x1 : F1, . . . , xn : Fn and
Γ .` φ : Ω. By {〈x1 . . . xn〉 ∈ F1 × · · · × Fn | φ}, I will denote the pullback of the following
diagram:
[Γ]
[Γ`φ:Ω]

1
true // Ω
Now for F
f1→ F1, . . . , F fn→ Fn write F, f1, . . . , fn  φ if F 〈f1,...,fn〉→ [Γ] factors through
{〈x1 . . . xn〉 ∈ F1 × · · · × Fn | φ} → [Γ]. In what follows, f1 ◦ g, . . . , fn ◦ g will be denoted
by f ◦ g. Moreover, let [Γ ` φ : Ω] = true[Γ] be written as Γ E φ.
Fact 37.
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Γ, x : A ` x : A
Γ `M : A Γ ` N : A
Γ `M ≈ N : Ω Γ ` fin! : 1
Γ `M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : A×B
Γ, x : A `M : B
Γ ` λx : A.M : BA
Γ `M : BA Γ ` N : A
Γ `M oN : B
Γ `M : A×B
Γ ` Π1M : A
Γ `M : A×B
Γ ` Π2M : B
f : F1, . . . , Fn → E ∈ Sg(E ) Γ `M1 : F1 . . .Γ `Mn : Fn
Γ ` fM1 . . .Mn : E
true := fin! ≈ fin! φ ∧ ψ := 〈φ, ψ〉 ≈ 〈true, true〉
∀x : A.φ := λx : A.φ ≈ λx : A.true φ ψ := φ ∧ ψ ≈ φ
∃x : A.φ := ∀t : Ω.((∀x : A.φ t) t) false := ∀t : Ω.t
φ ∨ ψ := ∀t : Ω.((φ t) ∧ (ψ  t) t) ¬φ := φ false
Table 4: Typing rules and defined abbreviations of the Mitchell-Be`nabou language of E
[E] := E [1] := 1 [Ω] := Ω [A×B] := [A]× [B] [BA] := [B][A]
[x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An] := [A1]× · · · × [An]
[Γ, x : A ` x : A] = pi : [Γ]× [A]→ [A] [Γ ` fin! : 1] = fin![Γ]
f ∈ E [A1 × · · · ×An, B] [Γ `M1 : A1] = σ1 : [Γ]→ [A1] . . . [Γ `Mn : An] = σn : [Γ]→ [An]
[Γ ` fM1 . . .Mn : B] := f ◦ 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 : [Γ]→ B
[Γ `M : A] = σ : [Γ]→ [A] [Γ ` N : A] = τ : [Γ]→ [A]
[Γ `M ≈ N : Ω] := χ〈id[Γ],id[Γ]〉 ◦ 〈σ, τ〉
[Γ `M : A] = σ : [Γ]→ [A] [Γ ` N : B] = τ : [Γ]→ [B]
[Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : A×B] := 〈σ, τ〉 : [Γ]→ [A]× [B]
[Γ `M : A×B] = σ : [Γ]→ [A]× [B]
[Γ ` Π1M : A] := Π1 ◦ σ : [Γ]→ [A]
[Γ `M : A×B] = σ : [Γ]→ [A]× [B]
[Γ ` Π2M : B] := Π2 ◦ σ : [Γ]→ [B]
[Γ, x : A `M : B] = σ : [Γ]× [A]→ [B]
[Γ ` λx : A.M : BA] := curry[Γ]×[A],[B](σ) : [Γ]→ [B][A]
[Γ `M : BA] = σ : [Γ]→ [B][A] [Γ ` N : A] = τ : [Γ]→ [A]
[Γ `M oN : B] := eval[A],[B] ◦ 〈τ, σ〉
Table 5: Interpretation of types, contexts and terms-in-context
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• F, f  φ iff [Γ ` φ : Ω] ◦ f = trueF
• Γ E φ iff for any F f→ [Γ], it holds that F, f  φ
The following result, which can be found as Theorem VI.6.1 in [MM92] or Theorem II.8.4
in [LS86], connects the definition of forcing given above with more standard intuitionistic
semantics:
Theorem 38 (Beth-Kripke-Joyal semantics in an elementary topos). Assume F
f1→ E1, . . . , F fn→
En and Γ = x1 : E1 . . . xn : En.
• F, f  φ ∧ ψ iff F, f  φ and F, f  ψ
• F, f  φ∨ψ iff there are arrows G g→ F and H h→ F s.t. G+H [g,h] F is epi, G, f ◦g  φ
and H, f ◦ h  ψ
• F, f  φ ψ iff for any G g→ F it holds that G, f ◦ g  ψ whenever G, f ◦ g  φ
• F, f  ¬φ iff for any G g→ F , it holds that G ∼= 0 whenever G, f ◦ g  φ
For the case of quantified formulas, note that Γ ` ∀xn+1 : En+1.φ iff Γ, xn+1 : En+1 ` φ.
Same holds for Γ ` ∃xn+1 : En+1.φ. Then we have:
• F, f  ∀xn+1 : En+1.φ iff for every G g→ F and every G g
′
→ En+1 it holds that G, f1 ◦
g, . . . , fn ◦ g, g′  φ
• F, f  ∃xn+1 : En+1.φ iff there exist G g
′
→ En+1 and an epi G
g
 F s.t. G, f1 ◦g, . . . , fn ◦
g, g′  φ
• F, f  σ ≈ τ iff [Γ ` σ : E] ◦ f = [Γ ` τ : E] ◦ f
The clauses for ∃ and ∨ above resemble those of intuitionistic Beth semantics. This is
why “Beth-Kripke-Joyal” seems a more appropriate name in the general case of an arbi-
trary elementary topos; see, e.g., [Gol06, Section 14.6]. However, when the topos happens
to be the topos of presheaves, i.e., covariant functors into Set, on a given small category
R—in particular, a poset taken as a category—the definition of forcing can be significantly
simplified.5
Perhaps the most straightforward account of this simplification can be found in [LS86].
First, the clause for disjunction can be “kripkefied” for indecomposable objects and the clause
for existential quantifiers—for projective ones [LS86, Proposition 8.7]. Second, the second
clause of Fact 37 suggests that to check validity of a given judgement-in-context Γ ` φ : Ω in
a topos, it is enough to restrict attention to those F which belong to a generating set for a
given topos. Third, by the Yoneda Lemma, in a topos of presheaves SetR for an arbitrary
small category R, objects of the form homCR := R[C,−] for any given C ∈ R satisfy all these
conditions: they are projective, indecomposable and do form a generating set. Moreover, also
by the Yoneda Lemma, elements of SetR [homCR , F ] are in 1−1 correspondence with elements
of F (C):
SetR [homCR , F ] 3 f → f˘ := fC(idC)
F (C)× homCR 3 (c, h)→ cˆ(h) := Fh(c)
5Reader should be warned that in most of categorical literature, presheaves are assumed to be contravariant,
but see, e.g., [Ghi89] for an example of the covariant convention.
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Note also that in clauses like the one for  , we can restrict attention to those G g→ F whose
source G lies in the generating set. In the case of SetR , this means replacing G
g→ homCR with
elements of SetR [homDR , hom
C
R ]. But, by the Yoneda Lemma again, these can be replaced
with arrows in R[C,D] (note the change of direction!).
Taking all this into account, we can obtain the following modified version of the semantics—
this time properly ”Kripkean” (see [LS86, Proposition 9.3]).
Corollary 39 (Kripke-Joyal semantics in a topos of presheaves). Let R be a small category,
F1, . . . , Fn ∈ SetR, C ∈ R, c1 ∈ F1(C), . . . cn ∈ Fn(C) , Γ = c1 : F 1, . . . , cn : Fn and
Γ ` φ : Ω. Write C, c  φ for homCR , cˆ1, . . . , cˆn  φ. Given any f ∈ R[C,D], write f(c) for
cˆ1(f), . . . , cˆn(f)—that is, Ff(c1), . . . , Ff(cn). Then we have:
• C, c  φ ∧ ψ iff C, c  φ and C, c  ψ
• C, c  φ ∨ ψ iff C, c  φ or C, c  ψ
• C, c  φ ψ iff for any f ∈ R[C,D], D, f(c)  ψ whenever D, f(c)  φ
• C, c  ¬φ iff for any f ∈ R[C,D], it does not hold that D, f(c)  φ
• C, c  ∀xn+1 : Fn+1.φ iff for every f ∈ R[C,D] and d ∈ Fn+1(D), it holds that
D, f(c), d  φ
• C, c  ∃xn+1 : Fn+1.φ iff there exist d ∈ Fn+1(C) s.t. C, c, d  φ
[Ghi89] uses toposes of presheaves as a generalization of Kripke semantics for the intuition-
istic first-order logic to prove incompleteness results. Of numerous follow-ups of that work,
let me just mention [NI97; Skv12]. Let us also note that the derivation of Corollary 39 from
Theorem 38 takes a somewhat more roundabout route in [MM92]: toposes of presheaves are
handled there as a subclass of toposes of sheaves on a site.
5.2 Non-expansive Morphisms, Fixpoints and Scattered Toposes
Let E be an elementary topos. Call an endomorphism f ∈ E [X,X] unchanging [EJP00] or
non-expansive if
E ∀x, y : X.(fx ≈ fy  x ≈ y) x ≈ y.
As noted in [EJP00], in a boolean setting non-expansive means just constant : negate the
sentence and play with boolean laws. Obviously then a classical proof that a non-expansive
endomorphism on a non-empty set has a unique fixed point does not carry much computational
content. In a constructive setting, however, the situation is different.
Assume ` φ, ψ : ΩX and f ∈ E [X,X] and define:
SubTe(φ) :=∀x, y : X(φox ∧ φoy  x ≈ y)
φ ⊆ ψ :=∀x : X.(φox ψox)
MaxST(φ) :=SubTe(φ) ∧ ∀α : ΩX .(SubTe(α) ∧ φ ⊆ α α ⊆ φ)
Non exp(f) :=∀x, y : X.(fx ≈ fy  x ≈ y) x ≈ y
fix sof :=λx : X.(x ≈ fx)
With this apparatus, we can state the main Theorem of Section 3 of [EJP00]:
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Theorem 40. Assume E is an elementary topos and f ∈ E [X,X]. Then
E Non exp(f) MaxST(fix sof ).
Remark 41. A proof formalized in the Coq proof assistant is available from the author,
see Remark 1. Those who would like to try a manual yet rigorous proof in the Mitchell-
Be`nabou language should do first Exercise 5 in [LS86, p. 139] and then formalize the
proof in [EJP00, p. 105] using all the abbreviations given above.
Remark 42. Some of derivations in [Esa98; EJP00], especially when fully formalized
in a proof assistant, make explicit an interesting fact: certain axioms governing quan-
tification which are not generally intutionistically valid (e.g., the Kuroda axiom and its
generalization due to Casari), become valid in presence of a KM modality, even though
these axioms do not involve any modalities at all in their statement. Some related obser-
vations are made by [Bir12] (a reference I became aware of having written the published
version of this overview).
In words, this result says: the fixpoints of a non-expansive endomorphism form a maximal
subterminal subobject.6 The syntactic shape of SubTef easily suggests that subterminality is
the internal counterpart of “being of cardinality at most one”, i.e., uniqueness of fixpoints.
However, the situation with existence is more complicated. First of all, toposes of presheaves
can differ significantly from the topos of sets in having non-trivial objects with no global
elements whatsoever. More importantly, even being inhabited is not enough to ensure maximal
subterminal objects are global elements.
Example 43 ([EJP00]). Consider the topos of presheaves on (ω + 1,unrhd), where unrhd is the
converse of the standard ordinal order. Presheaf X defined as X(n) = n + 1 and X(ω) = ω
with X(β unrhd α)(n) = min(n, α) is clearly inhabited. Furthermore, f : X → X defined as
fn(i) = min(i+ 1, n) and fω(i) = i+ 1 is a non-expansive endomorphism. Yet it fails to have
a fixpoint—i.e., a global element 1
c→ X s.t. f ◦ c = c.
Of course, we can do better in special cases.
Corollary 44. Whenever X ∈ E is s.t. any maximal subterminal subobject of X is a global
element (for example, X is an injective object), there exists fin!
c→ X s.t. f ◦ c = c for any
non-expansive f ∈ E [X,X].
We could try to express unique existence in the internal logic using the standard abbrevi-
ation ∃! for “exists exactly one”. However, as kindly pointed out by Thomas Streicher, this
abbreviation works as intended in toposes of presheaves, but not necessarily in arbitrary ones.
But where is the place for a modality in all this? Say that } : Ω → Ω is a strong Lo¨b
operator if E ∀p : Ω.(}p  p)  p. Also, call a morphism f ∈ E [X,Z] }-contractive if
E ∀x, y : X.}(x ≈ y) (fx ≈ fy):
6The corresponding theorem in [EJP00] contained also an additional statement about density of the support
of the fixed-point subobject, but this does not seem essential for us here.
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Corollary 45. Let } : Ω→ Ω be a strong Lo¨b operator, f ∈ E [X,X], and assume that f is
}-contractive. Then f is non-expansive and hence its subobject of fixed points is a maximal
subterminal one.
Proof. We have that E ∀p, q : Ω.(}p  (p ∨ q))  ((q  p)  p). In fact, this is an
equivalent form of (slo¨b)—cf. the proof of Theorem 2(iv) in [EJP00]. Now substitute x ≈ y
for p and fx ≈ fy for q to get the result.
[EJP00] states the result only for a special case of contractiveness and a special subclass
of toposes (introduced below) but this generalization is straightforward. As before, we can
derive the conclusion about the existence of unique fixed points whenever every maximal
subterminal object of X happens to be a global element—e.g., whenever X is injective.
Define φ := ∀t : Ω.(t ∨ (t φ)), i.e., an internalized coderivative. We have the following
counterpart of Proposition 19:
Proposition 46. In any elementary topos E , we have E ∀p : Ω.p  p and E ∀p, q :
Ω.p (q ∨ (q  p)).
A scattered topos is defined analogously to scattered locales or Heyting algebras in Section
4.2 by the validity of the only remaining KM law, i.e., the axiom ∀p : Ω.(p p) p. Thus,
scattered toposes are those where  is a strong Lo¨b operator. This notion turns out to have
several equivalent characterizations, see [EJP00]. Let us discuss in detail here another one
for the special case of SetR :
Theorem 47. Let R = (W, unlhd ) be a poset. Then SetR is scattered iff (W, unlhd ,  ) satisfies
any of the equivalent conditions in Corollary 26.
Proof. For a direct proof, it is useful to compute the semantic meaning of. Define : Ω→ Ω
as [p : Ω ` p : Ω]. Recall also that in a topos of the form SetR for R = (W, unlhd ), Ω(w) is
equal to {A∩ {w}unlhd ↑| A ∈ Upunlhd (W )}. A morphism f : Ω→ Ω is a natural transformation: a
family of mappings {fw : Ω(w)→ Ω(w) | w ∈W} satisfying
fz(A ∩ {z}unlhd ↑) = fw(A) ∩ {z}unlhd ↑ for any A ∈ Ω(w), z unrhd w.
Now let us note the following
Fact 48. For any topos of the form SetR where R = (W, unlhd ), for any w ∈ W and for any
A ∈ Ω(w) (i.e., A an upward closed subset of {w}unlhd ↑),
w(A) = {z unrhd w | {z} ↑⊆ A}.
The reader may want to consult Section 4 and Table 3 for the notation used above; in
particular, recall that {z} ↑= {z}unlhd ↑ −{z}. Note also that we can add an atomic clause to
Corollary 39 in the preceding section:
Fact 49. w,A  t (where Γ = t : Ω and A ∈ Ω(w)) iff A = {w}unlhd ↑.
This fact, while rather basic, is worth an explicit proof, as it helps to put together several
definitions and propositions above:
Proof of Fact 49. w,A  t is an abbreviation for homwR , Aˆ  t, while this in turn can be
reformulated as Aˆ = true ◦ fin!homwR (Fact 37). In particular, Aˆ(w unlhd w) = {w}unlhd ↑. But
Aˆ(w unlhd w) = A.
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Fact 49 can be generalized with variable t on the right hand side of the turnstile replaced
with arbitrary φ(t). Somewhat informally speaking, w,A  φ(t) iff the value of φ(A) contains
{w}unlhd ↑ (think of φ here as a polynomial on the Heyting algebra of upward closed subsets of
{w}unlhd ↑).
Putting all this together, we get that w,A  (p p) p iff for any z unrhd w, it holds that
z,A ∩ {z}unlhd ↑ (p  p) implies {z}unlhd ↑⊆ A. That is, {z′ unrhd z | {z′} ↑⊆ A} ⊆ A only if
{z}unlhd ↑⊆ A and in order for Set(W,unlhd ) to be scattered this has to hold for any w ∈ W , any
z unrhd w and any A ∈ Ω(w). But then the reasoning can be completed just like in the case of
Corollary 26. This finishes the proof of Theorem 47.
5.3 Topos of Trees and Its Generalizations
[BMSS12] introduced the topos of trees (or forests) S, i.e., the topos of presheaves on (ω,unrhd),
where unrhd is the converse of the usual order on ω. Let us begin with the observation that an
axiomatization of the mHC-logic of the underlying frame of S can be obtained by means of
techniques introduced in Section 4.3.
Theorem 50. KM⊕ LC is the propositional logic of (ω,unrhd, >).
Proof (sketch). Just like in the first sentence of the proof of Corollary 32, we note that
σmix(KM⊕ LC) is a just a notational variant of GLcl.3 := GLcl ⊕ .3. This logic in turn can
be shown (using standard modal techniques) to be the logic of natural numbers with reverse
strict order taken as a classical Kripke frame. The result now follows from properties of σmix·
which are not quoted explicitly in Theorem 28, but can be extracted immediately from the
original references, for example [WZ97, Prop. 21].
Reasoning analogous to those in proofs of Corollary 39 and Theorem 47 yields then that
KM⊕LC coincides with the set of S-validities in the Mitchell-Be´nabou language restricted to
(topos-theoretical counterparts of) connectives in Lint together with , the latter interpreted
in in Set(ω,unrhd) by  as specified by Fact 48 above. Similar observations underly recent proof-
theoretical investigations of this logic in [CG14].
Theorem 47 shows that the topos of trees is scattered. Ω-endomorphism “” (this notation
here would risk clashing with the one for a strict partial order and its converse) defined in
[BMSS12] is easily seen to coincide with . The Internal Banach Fixpoint Theorem 2.9 of
[BMSS12] shows that -contractive mappings on arbitrary inhabited objects in S do have
(unique) fixpoints.
Now, Example 43 above shows that such a strong statement is not valid in arbitrary scat-
tered toposes of presheaves, even quite similar to S. The crucial Lemma 2.10 in [BMSS12] is
not amenable to far-reaching generalizations.
However, [BMSS12, Section 8] discusses a whole class of toposes together with a notion
of a contractiveness guaranteeing fixpoint’s existence. The class in question are sheaves on
complete Heyting algebras with a well-founded basis [DM04] rather than just presheaves
on Noetherian partial orders—crucially, S can be also seen as such a sheaf topos—and the
required notion of contractiveness is stronger than the one expressible in the internal logic.
Let us elaborate on the last point. As we saw, toposes allow an internal interpretation of
modalities as morphisms Ω→ Ω. Actually, from the “propositions as predicates” perspective,
any operation on subobjects of a given object is a “local” candidate for a modality. However,
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constructive or categorical logic is mostly about “propositions as types”; see, e.g., [AMPR01;
BPR01; PR11; BP00; PD01; PR11] for modal aspects. This perspective works even with mild
assumptions about the underlying category. In particular, algebraic type theories require only
finite products, whereas ccc’s correspond to functional type theories [Cro93]: those whose
type system is in fact that of Brouwerian semilattices of Remark 7 above. To see the details
of this correspondence, just remove the rules for Ω, ≈ and all abbreviations using these from
Tables 4 and 5, then interpret conjunctions as products and implication as exponentation.
From this perspective, modalities correspond to endofunctors. In particular, ND systems
for PLLi and S4i are interpreted by, respectively, monads and comonads—see, e.g., references
in Remark 17—and SLi yields a special subclass of pointed or applicative functors. [MP08]
More precisely, one obtains a variant of [BMSS12, Definition 6.1]. Possible differences are:
the modal assumption of normality forces only being monoidal wrt cartesian structure (cf.
[BPR01; PR11]) rather than preservation of all finite limits as in the second clause of that
definition; furthermore, the assumption of uniqueness in the first clause would rely on exact
reduction and conversion rules of the proof system. A systematic study of such endofunc-
tors in a cartesian setting—i.e., assuming only the presence conjunction among propositional
connectives—has been undertaken by [ML13] under the name of guarded fixpoint categories.
Other possible names for such endofunctors include contraction, delay, (strong) Lo¨b, SLi and
MGRT, the last being an abbreviation of the original name in [BMSS12].
One can relate these two views on modalities. Whenever F : E → E is monic-preserving
and E has pullbacks, associate with a F -coalgebra C
γ→ FC a modality [F.γ] on subobjects
M
m C:
[F.γ]M

//
[F.γ]m
J
// C
γ

FM //
Fm // FC
(see [AMMS12] for the history of this diagram in papers on well-founded coalgebras). Further-
more, whenever F is pointed (applicative), i.e., a Ri-endofunctor with (F) : 1→ F being the
point or unit of F , (F)M is a subcoalgebra of (F)C for any M
m C and hence m ≤ [F.(F)C ]m,
i.e., the “local” translation of (r) is universally valid.
Remark 51. [BMSS12, Theorem 6.8] allows to isolate sufficient conditions ensuring
that the operator [F.(F)C ] induced by a SL
i-endofunctor F : E → E is a SLi-modality:
pullback-preservation of F and E being a topos. While it is not mentioned in [BMSS12],
one can find natural counterexamples when such conditions are dropped!
The operation on subobjects of C ∈ S induced by  : Ω → Ω from Fact 48 is defined
in an alternative way in [BMSS12]: as [ .( )C ] for a delay endofunctor  : S → S, whose
action on objects is ( C)(0) := 1 and ( C)(n+ 1) := ( C)(n). In a sense,  can be called
the Cantor-Bendixson endofunctor. Factoring through it is the desired “external” notion of
contractivity ensuring fixpoint’s existence. Both notions nicely complement each other:
. . . the external notion provides for a simple algebraic theory of fixed points for not
only morphisms but also functors (see Section 2.6), whereas the internal notion is
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useful when working in the internal logic. [BMSS12]
Could [EJP00] have had more impact if the authors had a) employed the external perspec-
tive on modalities in addition to the internal one and b) had the hindsight of [DM04]? This
is rather too counterfactual a question to consider. Note also that what matters from the
point of view of [BMSS12]—and Theoretical CS in general—is the use made of these exter-
nal and internal Lo¨b modalities. [BMSS12, Section 3] constructs a model of a programming
language with higher-order store and recursive types entirely inside the internal logic of S.
[BMSS12, Section 4] provides semantic foundation for dependent type theories extended with
a SLi modality and guarded recursive types; this can be regarded as an extension of fixpoint
results along the lines of Section 3 above to predicate and higher-order constructive logics.
[BMSS12, Section 5] shows that a class of (ultra-)metric spaces commonly used in modelling
corecursion on streams is equivalent to a subcategory of S.
Clearly, this is a large area rather overlooked by researchers on (intuitionistic) modal logic
side. There is no space here to discuss my own work in progress, e.g., on the Curry-Howard
interpretation of mHC, but let us conclude with a question from participants of ToLo III: is
there a natural subclass of internal modalities in toposes (endomorphisms Ω → Ω) inducing
external modalities (endofunctors) in a generic way?
Remark 52. Earlier incarnations of this paper included also a question by Lars Birkedal:
what are additional logical principles which would allow a scattered topos to model not
only guarded (co-)recursion, but also, e.g., countable nondeterminism? However, a recent
work [BBM14] addressed the issue: expressing the additional property needed for stating
the adequacy of the logical relation requires more than logical connectives introduced so
far. It can be only stated in presence of an additional modality right adjoint to double
negation.
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